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STATE DRONE LAWS: A LEGITIMATE ANSWER 
TO STATE CONCERNS OR A VIOLATION OF 
FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Ray Carver* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, in an effort to embrace new technology and to develop the 
infrastructure for the use of next-generation technology,1 Congress 
passed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Modernization 
and Reform Act of 2012 (the Act).2 While it intended to prepare the 
aviation industry for advances in the field, the Act underscored a 
tension that had been building domestically regarding the proper 
domestic use of “drones” or, more accurately, unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS).3 
Among other initiatives, the new law instructed the FAA to 
develop a plan to “accelerate the integration of civil unmanned 
aircraft systems into the national airspace systems.” 4  Its passage 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate 2015, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank my wife 
Anna for her continued love and support through this process. Having such a great partner has made law 
school a much more gratifying experience. I would also like to thank the members of the Georgia State 
University Law Review and the College of Law faculty for their guidance in this endeavor.  
 1. 158 CONG. REC. S333-02 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2012) (statements of Sen. Rockefeller, 
acknowledging that the “bill takes concrete steps to modernize our air traffic control system,” and Sen. 
Hutchison, stating that the bill will modernize the “antiquated air traffic control system”); 158 CONG. 
REC. H445-04 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2012) (statement of Rep. Petri, noting that the bill allows for the safe 
integration of UASs as well as investments in airport improvements). 
 2. Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
126 Stat 11. 
 3. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil Liability Concerns Arising 
From Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of Unmanned Aerial Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623, 627, 
641–42 (2009) (noting the privacy concerns and safety issues caused by the many UAS crashes due to 
pilot error and aircraft malfunction); Pete Yost, Justice Department Spent Nearly $5M on Drones, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/justice-dept-ig-fbi-spent-over-3m-
drones (noting the privacy issues arising from UASs with the “unique capability” to quietly watch and 
track citizens); Michael S. Rosenwald, A Drone of Your Very Own, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2013, at A1 
(discussing some of the negative and positive aspects of drone use). Although many opponents of the 
use of UASs refer to them pejoratively as drones, this note will use the term UASs because it is the most 
common legal term used and was the term used in the Act. Wendie L. Kellington, Unmanned Air 
Systems and Regulating Navigable Airspace, SV003 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 613, 615 (2013) (stating that 
unmanned aerial vehicles are often referred to pejoratively as “drones”). 
 4. FAA Modernization and Reform Act, § 332(a)(1). The Act calls for the integration and the 
development of six test ranges for unmanned aircraft systems research and development throughout the 
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coincided with several other privacy and security debates, including 
the use of weaponized UASs on the battlefield and the revelation that 
the National Security Administration (NSA) was gathering data on 
U.S. citizens. 5  These controversies have only heightened the 
apprehension among state and local officials about the use of UASs 
in domestic airspace.6 
In response, many states and municipalities have passed laws 
regulating the use of UASs and, in some cases, have banned their 
flight completely.7 Most of the laws directly address the fear that 
UASs will be used by law enforcement for warrantless surveillance 
or will be weaponized for more lethal purposes against U.S. citizens.8 
However, other lawmakers have taken less nuanced approaches and 
have proposed banning them from flying over towns or even giving 
citizens licenses to shoot them out of the sky.9 
While addressing their constituents’ concerns, lawmakers may 
encroach on the sovereignty of the federal government.10 Congress 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. to be accomplished by September 30, 2015. Id. § 332(c)(1). 
 5. See Karen DeYoung & Peter Finn, 4 Americans Killed in Drone Strikes Since ‘09, WASH. POST, 
May 23, 2013, at A1 (describing incidents involving the death of four Americans due to 
counterterrorism strikes by UASs); see also Peter Finn & Ellen Nakashima, Obama Defends NSA 
Collection of Citizens’ Data, WASH. POST, June 8, 2013, at A1 (describing the controversy over the 
NSA’s policy of collecting data on the phone records of citizens). 
 6. See Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 
CALIF. L. REV. 57, 57–58 (2013) (stating that states fear “dragnet surveillance” due to the “wide array of 
privacy-invading technologies” like cameras that can detect heat and odors); Rapp, supra note 3, at 641–
42 (noting the privacy concerns as well as safety issues due to the many UAS crashes due to pilot error 
and aircraft malfunction). 
 7. OR. REV. STAT. § 837.310 (2013) (prohibiting any law enforcement agency from operating a 
UAS); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003 (West 2013) (making it illegal for any person to use “an 
unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an individual . . . with the intent to conduct surveillance”); 
2013 Va. Acts 755 (imposing a two-year moratorium on the use of unmanned aircraft systems). 
 8. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (2013) (prohibiting the use of a UAS for the purpose of conducting 
surveillance or evidence gathering); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.310 (prohibiting any law enforcement agency 
from operating a UAS); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003; see also Allie Bohm, Drone Legislation: 
What’s Being Proposed in the States?, ACLU FREE FUTURE BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013, 3:15 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/drone-legislation-whats-being-
proposed-states. 
 9. Matt Pierce, Colorado Town Shoots Down Drone-Hunting Ordinance, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-drone-hunting-law-rejected-colorado
20140402-story.html. Deer Trail, Colorado, proposed an ordinance that would allow citizens to buy 
drone hunting licenses that would let them shoot down any UASs flying over the town. Residents of the 
town voted down the ordinance. Id. 
 10. See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012). 
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maintains supremacy over state laws when it expresses its intent to 
preempt or its intent is implied either through conflict or when the 
“field” has been taken up by the enactment of federal laws and 
regulations. 11  Congress has expressly asserted “exclusive 
sovereignty” over the regulation of airspace.12 Although the statutory 
language seems to demonstrate Congress’s intent to preempt all state 
laws, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that rather than 
asserting a general preemption, any determination will be based on 
the pervasiveness of the regulations on a case-by-case basis.13 When 
evaluating pervasiveness, courts consistently note the extent and 
intensity of federal regulation in the aviation field but reiterate that 
there is often room for state laws as well.14 
Therefore, the answer as to whether any room remains for states to 
regulate UASs hinges on which subfield within aviation that state 
laws are regulating and the pervasiveness of the federal regulations.15 
If the laws are deemed to regulate airspace or safety, the voluminous 
regulations currently in place preempt the state law from 
enforcement.16 However, if the law regulates a traditional state arena 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914, 925 (1970) (holding that an 
ordinance which restricted nighttime flights due to concerns over noise was preempted because 
Congress intended to “centralize full and dominant control of the navigable air apace in the Federal 
Government”); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“The scheme of federal 
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it.”). But see Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 
(1985) (stating that the local law governing the collection of blood plasma was not preempted because 
the FDA’s intention was not to preempt the state law). 
 12. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (“The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace 
of the United States.”); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 
590, 760 (1954) (quoting an earlier version of the statute, which stated that the United States is 
“declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space above the 
United States” (quoting 49 U.S.C § 176(a) (1938))). 
 13. Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 595. The Court also stated that while the language in the Air 
Commerce Act of 1926 was “an assertion of exclusive national sovereignty” over navigable airspace, 
[it] “did not expressly exclude the sovereign powers of the states.” Id. 
 14. Nw. Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (noting that although the regulation of air 
travel is voluminous, there are still areas on which the state may still legislate, including tax). 
 15. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (“[I]ntent to occupy a given 
field . . . may be inferred where the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation 
by the States . . . .”). 
 16. Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Because the legislative 
history of the FAA and its judicial interpretation indicate that Congress’s intent was to federally regulate 
aviation safety, we find that any state or territorial standards of care relating to aviation safety are 
federally preempted.” (emphasis in original)). 
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or an area that the FAA has not addressed, the local laws may 
survive.17 
In Part I, this Note surveys current federal laws and proposed state 
and local statutes regarding UAS use to determine the extent that the 
federal government has asserted its control.18 In Part II, this Note 
examines whether the current federal laws contain any possible 
express preemptions.19 After analyzing the current case law regarding 
conflict and field preemption in aviation cases, Part III addresses 
what states may do to avoid subjecting their laws to a federal 
preemption.20 
I.   BACKGROUND 
Although there have been major developments in technology over 
the last decade, the development of UASs has been slow, in part, 
because of a lack of guidance from Congress and the FAA. 21 
Nevertheless, in the last several years the Department of Defense has 
used UASs for surveillance and even strikes on enemy combatants in 
other countries.22 The civil use of UASs over domestic airspace has 
not been as extensive; however, the FAA anticipates as many as 
30,000 UASs will be in use by 2030.23 This expected increase is 
                                                                                                                 
 17. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
654 (1995) (“[W]e have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead 
have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to 
supplant state law.”); John C. Nettels, Jr. & Jerrick L. Irby, Standard of Care Preemption in Aviation 
Litigation: Halting Steps to a Coherent Analysis, 76 J. AIR L. & COM. 327, 333 (2011). 
 18. See discussion infra Part I. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II. 
 20. See discussion infra Part III. 
 21. Mark Edward Peterson, The UAV and the Current and Future Regulatory Construct for 
Integration Into the National Airspace System, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 521, 525 (2006) (“[T]he full scale 
application of civilian UAVs has been stymied by . . . safety concerns surrounding integration and the 
lack of a regulatory regime to facilitate safe integration.”). 
 22. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689 (Feb. 13, 
2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) (noting that the most common public use of UASs occurs in the 
Defense Department and includes surveillance and weapons delivery); Peterson, supra note 21, at 545 
(discussing the history of UASs and the Department of Defense’s use of UASs for surveillance and 
strike capabilities). 
 23. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2011–2031, at 49 (2011), 
available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/
aerospace_forecasts/2011-2031/media/2011%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf (noting that the agency expects 
4
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attributable to new technological developments combined with the 
various possible uses in law enforcement and civil and commercial 
arenas.24 Realizing the United States was not ready for the increase 
due to a lack of infrastructure and regulation, Congress passed the 
Act not only to develop technology for UASs, but also to develop an 
infrastructure to usher in a new era of aviation.25 
The law’s passage coincides with rising concern over the limits of 
the U.S. government’s power, as reflected in the political debates 
regarding the authority of the military to use UASs to strike U.S. 
citizens as well as the ability of the NSA to collect large amounts of 
data on citizens.26 In March 2013, Senator Rand Paul’s twelve-hour 
filibuster during hearings for nomination of the CIA director 
reflected public apprehension. 27  In his speech, Senator Paul 
expressed concern about the power of the federal government and its 
ability to spy on and even strike its own citizens.28 His sentiment 
                                                                                                                 
there to be 10,000 UASs by 2016, 25,000 by 2021, and 30,000 by 2030). 
 24. Id. (stating that the increases are expected in military, civil government, and commercial 
applications because all three have an interest in the versatility and low cost of UASs); John Villasenor, 
Privacy, Security, and Human Dignity in the Digital Age: Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 459 (2013) (stating that drones could be used 
for surveying, crop spraying, and traffic congestion monitoring); Peterson, supra note 21, at 548–52 
(noting the possible uses in border security, traffic monitoring, natural disaster responses, and mail 
delivery). 
 25. 158 CONG. REC. S333-02 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2012) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller acknowledging 
that the “bill takes concrete steps to modernize our air traffic control system,” and Sen. Hutchison 
stating that the bill will modernize the “antiquated air traffic control system”); 158 CONG. REC. H445-04 
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 2012) (statements of Rep. Petri noting that the bill allows for the safe integration of 
UASs as well as investments in airport improvements). The bill will develop new satellite-based 
airspace management and digital communications that will allow for the more efficient and safe use of 
airspace. 158 CONG. REC. S333-02 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2012) (statement of Sen. Hutchison stating that the 
bill will “fundamentally transform air traffic control from a ground-based radar system to a satellite-
based system”); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., NEXTGEN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/implementation/media/NextGen_Implementation_Plan_2013.pdf. 
 26. See generally Michael Epstein, Note, The Curious Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi: Is Targeting a 
Terrorist for Execution by Drone Strike a Due Process Violation when the Terrorist is a United States 
Citizen?, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 723 (2011); see also DeYoung & Finn, supra note 5 (describing an 
incident involving the death of four Americans due to counterterrorism strikes by UASs); see also Finn 
& Nakashima, supra note 5 (describing the controversy over the National Security Agency’s policy of 
collecting data on the phone records of citizens); Time to Rein in the Surveillance State, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/node/43023 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (stating that the government is using the 
Patriot Act to “track all of the calls of millions of ordinary Americans”). 
 27. 159 CONG. REC. S1150 (2013). 
 28. Id. Senator Paul filibustered John Brennan’s nomination for CIA director due to statements made 
by Brennan and President Obama indicating the government does not plan to strike U.S. citizens on 
5
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engrossed the nation and spurred the trend of legislation limiting the 
use of UASs over domestic soil.29 By the end of 2013, forty-two 
states had introduced legislation addressing UASs, and thirteen states 
had enacted laws that regulate either public or civil UAS flight.30 
In 2013, Texas and Virginia were among the first states to pass 
anti-UAS legislation. 31  Soon afterward, several states and 
municipalities rushed to pass their own statutes.32 Anti-UAS laws 
take many forms, but generally fall into one of three types: 1) they 
ban law enforcement’s use of UASs for surveillance;33 2) they ban 
UASs equipped with weapons;34 or 3) they ban UAS use altogether.35 
A.   Preemption 
The issue of preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, which states that the “laws of the United States . . . shall 
be the supreme law of the land.”36 Therefore, when a court finds a 
federal law to have preempted state law, the court will declare the 
                                                                                                                 
American soil, but stopped short of assuring that it would not happen. Id. 
 29. See Bohm, supra note 8 (outlining the various anti-UAS bills introduced in state legislatures); 
see also RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC 
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 12 
(2013) (discussing some of the concerns over domestic UAS use for the purpose of surveillance). 
 30. 2013 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Legislation, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-
and-criminal-justice/unmanned-aerial-vehicles.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
 31. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003 (West 2013); 2013 Va. Acts 755. 
 32. See Bohm, supra note 8. 
 33. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (2013) (prohibiting the use of a UAS for the purpose of conducting 
surveillance or gathering of evidence); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.310 (2013) (prohibiting any law 
enforcement agency from operating a UAS); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003 (prohibiting any person 
from using “an unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an individual . . . with the intent to conduct 
surveillance”). 
 34. S.B. 1587, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (stating that the bill “provides that a law 
enforcement agency may not own or use a drone that is equipped with any kind of lethal or non-lethal 
weapon.”). 
 35. 2013 Va. Acts. 755 (declaring a two-year moratorium on the use of unmanned aircraft systems); 
BILL OF RIGHTS DEF. COMM., MODEL DRONE LEGISLATION: NO DRONES, available at 
http://www.constitutioncampaign.org/campaigns/resources/DronesAnnotated.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 
2014) (calling for a “drone-free zone” that would carry a fine of up to $1,000). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The courts have also found that federal supremacy applies equally to 
issues involving agency regulations as well as federal statutes. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. 
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1985); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“[W]hen an agency administrator promulgates pervasive regulations pursuant to his Congressional 
authority, we may infer a preemptive intent unless it appears . . . that Congress would not have 
sanctioned the preemption.”). 
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state law void.37 The courts will only find the federal law preempts 
the state law when there is evidence that Congress intended to 
preempt the state law.38 In straightforward cases, Congress expresses 
its intent to preempt in the form of a preemption clause.39 In the 
absence of a preemption clause, courts must determine whether 
Congress has implicitly preempted a state law.40 The courts may infer 
such intent from Congressional action either through a conflict 
between two laws or by finding that Congress has taken up the 
“field.”41 
1.   Conflict Preemption 
Conflict preemption exists where state and federal law directly 
conflict, giving rise to an inference that Congress intended federal 
law to preempt state law.42 Therefore, in cases where the court finds 
that a state statute conflicts with a federal law, the federal law 
supersedes the state’s statute.43 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Michael J. Holland, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Preemption in the Field of Air, 78 
DEF. COUNS. J. 11, 11 (2011) (stating that any law conflicting with a federal law is “‘without effect’” 
(quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 740 (1981))). 
 38. Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1986) (stating “the first and 
fundamental inquiry in any pre-emption analysis is whether Congress intended to displace state law”). 
 39. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222–23, 228 (1995) (holding that the Illinois 
Consumer Fraud Act was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, which prohibited states from 
passing laws which relate to “rates, routes, or services” because the state law meant to “police the 
marketing practices of the airlines”). The express preemption must also clearly state the preemptive 
intentions of Congress. See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 126 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Express preemption requires that Congress’s intent to preempt be ‘“explicitly stated in the statute’s 
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”‘” (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992))). 
 40. See Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 333 (stating that “court decisions have focused much 
attention on the interplay between the types of federal preemption”). 
 41. Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]mplied federal preemption 
may be found where federal regulation of a field is pervasive . . . or where state regulation of the field 
would interfere with congressional objectives.” (citations omitted)). Although the distinction between 
the types of preemption appears to be academic, the categories are frequently discussed by the courts. 
Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 333 (“[C]ourt decisions have focused much attention on the interplay 
between the types of federal preemption.”). 
 42. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (describing conflict 
preemption as a type of implied preemption where it is physically impossible to comply with both laws 
or the state law stands as an obstacle to the federal purpose); Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 331 
(stating that conflict preemption is one type of implied preemption). 
 43. 3 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 34:20 (3d ed. 2013) (“A state statute or 
local regulation is invalid when it conflicts with a federal statute or with an administrative 
7
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State law can conflict with federal law by making compliance with 
both either a “physical impossibility”44 or by standing as an obstacle 
to fulfilling the “purpose and objectives” of the federal law.45 If the 
state law frustrates the federal government’s purpose in passing the 
law or makes the enforcement of that law more difficult, the federal 
law or regulation will preempt it.46 
2.   Field Preemption 
When laws do not directly conflict and Congress has not expressed 
its intent, it leaves only the possibility of a field preemption.47 Here, 
courts will infer intent when the federal laws and regulations are “so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the States to supplement it.”48 
Courts first determine which level of the government traditionally 
asserts control over the area.49 When the field is one “the States have 
                                                                                                                 
regulation . . . .”); Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 329, 331 (stating that the Constitution gives 
Congress the ability to enact law that preempts state law if the intent is shown by one of many ways, 
including conflict). 
 44. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98–99 (holding the state regulation of occupational safety and health issues 
was preempted because it was in “conflict with the full purposes and objectives of the OSH Act”); 
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 134 (1913) (ruling a state law was preempted when it required 
labeling of containers that would require the destruction of labels required by Congress); Holland, supra 
note 37, at 11 (“[A]ny state law conflicting with a valid state law is ‘without effect’ . . . .”); Nettels & 
Irby, supra note 17, at 331 (“[Conflict preemption] is found where a private party’s efforts to comply 
with competing federal and state law or regulation is physically impossible.”). 
 45. Williamson v. Mazda Motor, 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1132 (2011) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). See also Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 331–32 (“The other variety of implied 
conflict preemption is found where state law is an obstacle to compliance with what Congress intended 
to be in the enacted federal law.”). 
 46. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (stating that there 
will be conflict preemption where “state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941))); Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 332–33. The Supreme Court also ruled that even if the laws 
“share a common goal,” the state law will be preempted if it “interferes with the methods by which a 
federal statue was intended to reach that goal.” Gade, 505 U.S. at 103 (holding that the Act did not 
prevent a state from making laws but did restrict the means of making those laws). 
 47. See Holland, supra note 37, at 13. 
 48. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1973) (quoting Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (finding a local ordinance restricting flights 
preempted because Congress has taken up the field of regulations in aviation and noise restrictions); 
Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 331 (stating that intent is inferred because the state is acting in a field 
that the federal government intended to “occupy exclusively”). 
 49. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (stating that since the federal law at issue was regulating a field in 
which the states traditionally occupied, the court begins with an assumption that the state law is not 
8
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traditionally occupied,” there is an assumption that the state law is 
not preempted.50 However, the reach of the federal regulation may 
overcome this assumption.51 
Next, courts analyze the scope and pervasiveness of the federal 
law or agency regulation.52 If Congress has regulated the entire field, 
courts find that the federal government intends to preempt even 
though, traditionally, the state may have controlled the arena. 53 
Therefore, if states have traditionally controlled the arena, it will not 
be preempted, unless the federal government has either expressed a 
desire to preempt state actions or has enacted so many regulations on 
the topic that no room remains for states to regulate.54 Although the 
amount and scope of aviation regulations appear to be vast,55 the 
                                                                                                                 
preempted). 
 50. Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 333 (“[T]he Supreme Court established a presumption that law 
traditionally left to the states is not to be preempted.”); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 
516 (1992) (“Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause ‘starts with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)). Although the court has 
been clear that they start with a presumption that the state law is not preempted, there is some indication 
this assumption is not as strong as the courts assert. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in 
Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968 (2002). 
 51. Burbank, 411 U.S. at 642–44 (finding the state law regulating noise preempted even though there 
was a presumption in favor of upholding the state law); Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 
1109, 1116 (2002) (stating that the state law did not benefit from a presumption because it was 
regulating an area—navigable airspace—that had a “history of significant federal presence” (quoting 
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000))). The Supreme Court has stated that for there to be 
preemption there must be a “‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” Automated Med., 471 U.S. at 
715–16 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519) (finding that the scope of the regulations did 
not show sufficient intent to overcome the presumption in favor of the states). 
 52. Automated Med., 471 U.S. at 716 (stating that the party must present evidence “that is strong 
enough to overcome the presumption that state and local regulation . . . can constitutionally coexist with 
federal regulation.”). 
 53. Skysign, 276 F.3d at 1116 (stating that a field preemption requires a finding that “Congress has 
so completely occupied the field that federal silence is itself a policy choice rather than a mere passive 
deferral to local authority.”). 
 54. See Automated Med., 471 U.S. at 713. However, the court also held that a statement by the 
agency declaring that it did not intend to “usurp the powers of the state to regulate” the issue is 
dispositive as to intent of the agency. Id. at 714. 
 55. The Supreme Court noted the extensiveness of the federal regulations when it stated: 
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like 
vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in 
the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal 
commands. The moment a ship taxies onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and 
detailed system of controls. . . . Its privileges, rights, and protection . . . it owes to the 
Federal Government alone and not to any state government. 
Nw. Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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courts have determined that there remains room for state laws 
depending on the pervasiveness of the regulations in that particular 
area within aviation.56 
B.   Preemption as Applied to Aviation Cases 
Congress has expressly asserted “exclusive sovereignty of airspace 
of the United States.”57 Even though Congress clearly expressed its 
purpose in asserting control over airspace, courts emphasize that 
there is no general express preemption in the broader field of 
aviation.58 Other than “sovereignty of airspace,” only one express 
preemption exists, and it involves the price, route, or service of an air 
carrier. 59  Accordingly, any preemption regarding UAS usage will 
likely rely on a field or conflict preemption, unless it is deemed a 
regulation of airspace or the operation of an air carrier.60 
In addition, federal statutes include a savings clause that purports 
to leave issues involving torts and contracts to the states.61 Revised 
and shortened in 1994 with the reorganization of Title 49,62 the new 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (“[I]ntent to occupy a given 
field . . . may be inferred where the persuasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation 
by the States.”); Automated Med., 471 U.S. at 715–16 (stating that pre-emption will be inferred when 
“the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of 
state laws . . . .” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941))). 
 57. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(a)(1) (West 2014). 
 58. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. Of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 595 
(1954) (“[This clause] was an assertion of exclusive national sovereignty . . . . The Act, however, did not 
expressly exclude the sovereign powers of the states.”). 
 59. 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (West 1997) (“States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or 
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that 
may provide air transportation under this subpart.”); Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 
784 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the plain language of 41713(b)(1) expressly prohibits States from 
regulating aviation rates, routes, or services . . . .”). 
 60. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (2011); 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2011); Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City of 
Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding a statute because it did not “reach into the 
forbidden, exclusively federal areas, such as flight paths, hours, or altitudes”). 
 61. 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2011) (“A remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies 
provided by law.”); Kaminski, supra note 6, at 73 (stating that the savings clause preserved the common 
law remedies such as state tort law claims). 
 62. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 985 F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Nothing contained in 
this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law . . . .”); Ann K. 
Wooster, Construction and Application of § 105 Airline Deregulation Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 41713), 
Pertaining to Preemption of Authority over Prices, Routes, and Services, 149 A.L.R. FED. 299 (2009) 
(indicating that the change in language essentially left the clause “untouched” because it provided for 
“common law and statutory remedies”). 
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language now simply states that “[a] remedy under this part is in 
addition to any other remedies provided by law.”63 Notwithstanding 
the language, appellate courts have been split on the issue of 
preemption in tort and contract claims.64 Most recently, the Supreme 
Court held that a state-law claim for breach of an implied covenant is 
preempted if it seeks to enlarge the contractual obligations of the 
parties.65 Even if the savings clause purports to leave room for state 
intervention, the Court has stated that the existence of a savings 
clause will not preclude a finding of federal field preemption.66 
On specific issues of noise control and safety, courts have held that 
states’ attempts to regulate aviation are preempted. 67  The Noise 
Control Act of 1972 and the Federal Aviation Act pervade the arena 
and speak directly to these issues.68 In addition, because the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 63. 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2011). Rather than a change in substance, this language was seen as a 
simplification of the language by eliminating unnecessary words. Thomas N. Tarnay, Aircraft Designs 
Subjected to FAA Special Certification Review, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 591, 624 n.180 (1996); Wooster, 
supra note 63, at § 2[a] (stating that the Act left untouched a “savings clause . . . providing viable 
common law and statutory remedies for airline negligence.”). 
 64. See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that federal law 
preempts in the area of standards of care; however, state remedies are still available for violations of 
those standards); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that 
claims for physical injury resulting from the negligent operation of an aircraft are not related to rates, 
routes, or services under the ADA); West v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148, 150 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the Aviation Deregulation Act (“ADA”) preempted West’s punitive damages claim, but 
“did not preempt his claim for compensatory damages under Montana law”). 
 65. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1433 (2014). Although the Court decided the 
case unanimously, it did not give a definitive answer as to which state laws are subject to federal 
preemption. Id. 
 66. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (“[T]he saving clause . . . does not bar 
the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”); Choate v. Champion Home Builders Co., 
222 F.3d 788, 794 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The presence of an express preemption provision . . . does not, by 
itself, foreclose an implied preemption analysis.”). 
 67. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 628 (1973) (finding a state law 
regulating noise omissions from planes preempted because the “‘aircraft and its noise are indivisible’” 
(quoting Am. Airlines v. Hempstead, D.C., 272 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff’d, 398 F.2d 369 
(2d Cir. 1968))); Blue Sky Entm’t, Inc. v. Town of Gardiner, 711 F. Supp. 678, 694 (N.D.N.Y. 1989). 
The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides the FAA with “full responsibility 
and authority” over the “promulgation and enforcement of safety regulations.” H.R. REP. NO. 85–2360, 
at 2 (1958). But see Ward v. State, 374 A.2d 1118, 1125 (Md. 1977) (finding that a state criminal law 
addressing reckless operation of an aircraft was not subject to a preemption because it did not purport to 
effect the pilot’s license and actually assisted in the congressional purpose). 
 68. Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C § 4911 (2012); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 
85-726, § 307(a), 72 Stat. 731, 749 (giving the FAA authority to regulate to ensure the safety of civil 
aviation and the efficient use of such airspace). 
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government has asserted the exclusive right to control airspace,69 any 
state regulation that impedes that right will be preempted. 70 
Therefore, in addition to noise and safety, municipalities cannot 
regulate airports in any manner that directly interferes with aircraft 
operations.71 
In an interesting set of cases, several courts discussed the issue of 
aerial advertising towed behind airplanes.72 The Colorado Supreme 
Court struck a state law regulating advertising messages towed by 
aircraft due to the FAA’s issuance of safety regulations and permits 
for operators of such aerial advertising.73 The court reasoned that the 
city only enforced the advertising law against airplane operators; 
therefore, the local ordinance was regulating the aircraft rather than 
the advertisement itself.74 The Ninth Circuit reiterated this sentiment 
in Skysign v. City of Honolulu when it stated that the ordinance was 
not entitled to a presumption of non-preemption because, rather than 
regulating advertising in general, it was targeting the use of 
airspace.75 These cases provide insight into the possible action of 
courts on the issue of UAS regulations and suggest that regulations 
                                                                                                                 
 69. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (2011); Nw. Airlines, Inc., v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“Air as an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized by 
the commerce clause than is navigable water.”). 
 70. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 627–28 (1973) (finding that a state law regulating noise “would 
cause a serious loss of efficiency in the use of the navigable airspace”); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena 
Airport Auth. v. City of L.A., 979 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 71. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 979 F.2d at 1340 (“It is settled law that non-
proprietor municipalities are preempted from regulating airports in any manner that directly interferes 
with aircraft operations.”). 
 72. Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a state 
law which prevented the aerial sign was preempted because the aircraft was operating under a certificate 
issued by the FAA); Banner Adver., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 868 P.2d 1077, 1082 (Colo. 1994) (stating 
that a state law prohibiting the towing of advertisements by aircraft was preempted because the “federal 
government also exercises pervasive control over the specific act of banner towing by an airplane.”). 
 73. Banner Adver., 868 P.2d at 1082. 
 74. Id. at 1082 (“The City has not enforced the ordinance against advertisers, only against airplane 
operators. Thus, it appears that it is not the advertising message that the City is regulating, but rather the 
conduct of the aircraft operators.”). 
 75. Skysign, 276 F.3d at 1116 (holding that the ordinance was targeting navigable airspace for 
regulation). However, the court upheld another ordinance restricting advertising that was generally 
applicable rather than targeted at the operation of the aircraft. Id. In upholding the statute, the court 
reasoned that the general ordinance was a regulation of advertising, not the use of airspace. Id. 
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directed toward the flight of UASs will be preempted, while 
regulations directed at other UAS usage effects may survive.76 
II.   ANALYSIS 
Because the overall goal of the FAA Modernization and Reform 
Act was to help modernize the use of the United States’ airspace, any 
state laws that conflict with its language, stated purpose, or implied 
intent are superseded by the Act and therefore are preempted. 77 
Because there is no general preemption in the field of aviation,78 
answering questions of preemption will require an analysis of the 
existing structure and language of federal laws in light of the 
doctrines of express preemption, conflict preemption, and field 
preemption. 
A.   Express Preemption 
Express preemption occurs only when Congress has expressly 
stated that state laws will be preempted by the enactment of a federal 
law or regulation. 79  Title 49, which covers the regulation of 
transportation, states that the “United States Government has 
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.”80 Under Title 
49, Congress placed “exclusive authority for regulating the airspace 
above the United States with the [FAA].” 81  Although this clause 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 1117 (finding that the general advertising regulation “does not actually reach into the 
forbidden, exclusively federal areas, such as flight paths, hours, or altitudes.”). 
 77. Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 330 (stating that preemption issues are dependent on 
congressional intent expressed either through express language or through the law’s structure and 
purpose). 
 78. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 595–96 
(1954) (stating that although the federal statutes declare sovereignty, preemption will be determined by 
looking at the particular area within aviation which is being regulated). 
 79. Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 126 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Express preemption 
requires that Congress’s intent to preempt be explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly 
contained in its structure and purpose. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 
(1992)) (internal quotations omitted); Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 330 (stating that an express 
preemption is indicated by “including a preemption clause or other similar provision within the enacted 
law.”). 
 80. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (2011). 
 81. Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that the state law which prohibited 
use of a heliport was not subject to an express preemption by the federal statute). 
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asserts the sovereignty of the federal government, courts do not view 
it as a clause that expressly preempts all state regulations.82 
The United States Code has only one clause that expressly 
preempts state action in the field of aviation. 83  The Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 contains a clause stating that “[s]tates may 
not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision . . . related 
to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air 
transportation.” 84  This language applies to “state enforcement 
actions” having a connection with or reference to airline “rates, 
routes, or services”85 Therefore, even if a statute does purport to 
directly regulate rates, routes, or services, action that has a significant 
impact on these areas will be preempted.86 
The preemption clause only affects persons operating as an “air 
carrier.”87 The code defines air carrier as “a citizen of the United 
States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The 
Federal Aviation Act has no express preemption clause.”); Holland, supra note 37, at *13 (noting that 
the Act did not contain an express preemption unlike the ADA which expressly preempted in areas of 
rate, route or service); 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 27 (2013) (stating the Federal Aviation Act “provides 
no general express preemption”). 
 83. Holland, supra note 37, at *12 (stating that while the FAA enabling act did not contain a 
preemption clause, the Airline Deregulation Act later inserted a preemption clause into the code). 
 84. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2011); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232 (1995) (stating 
that the ADA’s preemption clause and the Federal Aviation Act’s savings clause “‘stop[] States from 
imposing their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services’”); Wooster, supra 
note 63 (“[T]he ADA included a federal preemption provision to prevent the states from regulating the 
newly deregulated airline industry in the areas of prices, routes, and services.”). 
 85. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383–84, 386–90 (1992) (using a broad 
construction of the phrase “relating to” and defining it as having some relation to or a connection with 
routes, rates, or services); Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that 
the preemption clause “not only preempts the direct regulation of prices by states, but also preempts 
indirect regulation ‘relating to’ prices that have ‘the forbidden significant effect’ on such prices.” 
(quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 385, 388 (1992))). 
 86. Morales, 504 U.S. at 388 (holding that a state law governing deceptive fare advertisements was 
preempted because they not only reference fares but have a “forbidden significant effect upon fares.”); 
Witty, 366 F.3d at 383 (holding that even though a plaintiff’s negligence claim asserting that the airline 
should provide more leg room does not reference rates, it would have a significant economic impact and 
is therefore preempted). 
 87. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2011) (“States may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, 
route, or service of an air carrier”) (emphasis added)); Holland, supra note 37, at *12 (stating it has 
“now been well established that personal injury claims are not preempted as relating to rates, routes[,] or 
services, while cases alleging unfair collection of taxes, deceptive advertising, or state laws creating 
passengers’ bills of rights are preempted.”). 
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transportation.”88 The definition of interstate air transportation also 
limits the preemption clause to flights that transport passengers, 
property, or mail between states.89 
This provision will likely not impact state laws that completely 
ban the use of UASs, weaponization of UASs, or laws that limit UAS 
use for surveillance by law enforcement. UASs do not fit into this 
category of air carrier because they are not currently used for the 
transportation of passengers. Since the definition of unmanned 
aircraft simply refers to the presence of a pilot and not passengers,90 a 
UAS could possibly be used for air transportation while still 
qualifying as a UAS, making the preemption clause applicable. 
In addition, if a UAS were developed for the purpose of delivering 
mail or packages, it would fall under the preemption clause, and state 
laws having a significant impact on the services or routes of these 
aircraft would be preempted.91 
B.   Conflict Preemption 
Conflict preemption occurs when there is either a physical 
impossibility or the state law stands as an obstacle to the federal 
purpose.92 
                                                                                                                 
 88. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2011); see also 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(5) (2011) (defining air 
transportation as “foreign air transportation, interstate air transportation, or the transportation of mail by 
aircraft.”); 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2012) (“Air carrier means a person who undertakes directly by lease, or 
other arrangement, to engage in air transportation.”). 
 89. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(25) (2011) (defining “interstate air transportation” as “the transportation of 
passengers or property by aircraft as a common carrier for compensation, or the transportation of mail 
by aircraft”). 
 90. See Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No 112-
95, § 331(8–9), 126 Stat. 11 (“The term ‘unmanned aircraft’ means an aircraft that is operated without 
the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.”). 
 91. 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2011) (“States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other 
provision . . . related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air 
transportation . . . .”); Kellington, supra note 3, at 634 (stating that multiple companies are investigating 
the use of UASs for transporting goods or mail); Peterson, supra note 21, at 525 (stating that, among the 
many uses, UASs have the capability of delivering mail or packages); see Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 
513 U.S. 219, 232 (1995) (stating that the ADA’s preemption clause and the Federal Aviation Act’s 
savings clause “stop[] States from imposing their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, 
or services”). 
 92. RICH, supra note 43. 
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1.   Physical Impossibility 
Preemption by physical impossibility requires that an actor not be 
able to comply with both the federal and the state statutes at the same 
time.93  If the state law is more stringent than the federal law or 
requires similar action but the actor can still comply with both, it 
does not necessarily result in preemption.94 Courts often find that 
there are ways in which citizens may comply with both laws, leading 
some to note that physical impossibility is “often mentioned but 
rarely applied.”95 
Similar to previous cases heard by the courts, a state statute barring 
UASs from flying in certain areas, carrying weapons, or conducting 
surveillance does not directly conflict with the federal laws or 
regulations. Compliance with the state statute would not make 
compliance with the federal laws impossible because federal law is 
simply permissive in allowing the UAS flight. 
2.   Frustration of Purpose 
Even though the state statutes do not make it physically impossible 
to comply with the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, they may 
still “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 96  Since the stated 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Nettels & Irby, supra note 17, at 332 (“[Conflict preemption] is found where a private party’s 
efforts to comply with competing federal and state law or regulation is physically impossible.”). 
 94. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963) (upholding a California 
law requiring avocados to contain less than eight percent of oil while the federal law had no such 
requirement because there was “[n]o such impossibility of dual compliance”); Cloyd v. State, 943 So. 2d 
149, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a state law which punished pilots for operating aircraft 
while intoxicated did not conflict with the federal law because “a pilot could comply with both the 
Florida law and the federal law and regulations”). 
 95. See Davis, supra note 50, at 984, n.96; see, e.g., Gustafson v. Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 786 
(6th Cir. 1996) (upholding a state law that prohibits the landing of sea planes on Lake Angelus because 
it “does not make compliance with federal aviation law impossible”). 
 96. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (holding that a state law requiring alien 
registration stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal immigration law); see also Geier 
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 863 (2000) (finding a state common law action that 
required an automaker to install airbags conflicted with a federal law allowing various passive restraints 
and reasoning that it “would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal 
regulation sought”); U.S. v. Berkeley, 735 F. Supp. 937, 940 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (finding preempted state 
building codes that prevented the construction of an Airport Radar and reasoning that it stood “as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the statutory objective: the establishment and improvement of air 
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purpose of the Act is to incorporate UASs into the airspace,97 any 
state law obstructing this goal could be preempted. 
Laws that forbid law enforcement from using UASs could obstruct 
the Act’s purpose because a large portion of UAS use comes from the 
public sector.98 By preventing the use of such a large investor class, 
the states would slow down the FAA’s integration efforts. 99  In 
addition, laws banning the use of UASs entirely, including both civil 
and public use, could be subject to preemption for similar reasons.100 
Since the Act calls for the selection of six test sites throughout the 
U.S. in various climates to test the integration capabilities, bans 
would slow the integration process by limiting the geographic 
locations available and the effectiveness of the research.101 
Conflict preemption would likely not affect state statutes that 
simply ban the use of UASs for surveillance or the weaponization of 
the vehicles.102 Because they do not ban the flight of UASs, they 
likely would not impede the fulfillment of the federal goals. The 
states are permitted to place some restrictions in areas that impact 
aviation as long as they do not prevent the Act from accomplishing 
its purpose.103 Private and public entities would still be permitted to 
                                                                                                                 
navigation facilities for the safety of the public.”). 
 97. Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No 112-95, 
§ 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11 (directing the Secretary of Transportation to develop a plan to “safely 
accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system.”); Ajoke 
Oyegunle, Drones in the Homeland: A Potential Privacy Obstruction Under the Fourth Amendment and 
the Common Law Trespass Doctrine, 21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 365, 367 (2013) (stating that the 
intent was to provide funding to “revamp the nation’s air traffic control system.”). 
 98. Fact Sheet-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/news/
fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsID=14153. The FAA has recently made it easier for governmental 
agencies to obtain waivers for the flight of UASs, which will likely lead to more uses and investment by 
those agencies. ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42940, INTEGRATION OF DRONES INTO 
DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 4 (2013). 
 99. See DOLAN, supra note 98, at 28, 30 (2013) (explaining that many states currently have 
legislative proposals pending while the FAA has been tasked with developing a comprehensive plan to 
accelerate the integration of drones into the national airspace). 
 100. See generally Fact Sheet-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 98 (indicating civil use means 
use by private citizens, and public use means use by public entities and governmental agencies). 
 101. Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No 112-95, 
§ 332(c)(3)(a), 126 Stat. 11 (stating that test ranges will take into account geographic and climatic 
diversity when determining the location of the test ranges). 
 102. DOLAN, supra note 98, at 27–28 (2013). 
 103. RICH, supra note 43 (“[S]tate law will not be allowed which ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”). 
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operate UASs in navigable airspace as long as they were not doing so 
for the purposes of surveillance or weaponization. 
Various exceptions found in specific laws mitigate the threat of 
conflict preemption.104 The Texas statute allows for the use of UASs 
for “professional or scholarly research,” surveillance with a valid 
search warrant, emergencies, or use in airspace “designated as a test 
site or range authorized by the Federal Aviation Administration.”105 
These types of exceptions allow integration of UASs into the airspace 
while addressing the concerns of unlawful surveillance.106  Private 
and public actors are still permitted to participate in the research of 
UAS integration and can take advantage of the non-surveillance 
uses.107 
C.   Field Preemption 
State UAS laws will be subject to an implied field preemption if 
they aim to regulate a subfield within aviation that has been taken up 
by federal law or regulations.108  Although there is a presumption 
against preemption when the aim of the statute involves the 
traditional police powers of the states, the Supreme Court has noted 
that it is more willing to find a preemptive intent in certain areas 
within aviation that have a “history of significant federal presence,” 
including safety and navigable airspace.109 Therefore, if states are 
perceived as attempting to regulate concerns such as safety, noise, or 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 423.002(a)(1) (West 2013) (providing exception to state 
regulations for use of unmanned aircrafts for professional or scholarly research purposes). 
 105. Id. § 423.002(a). 
 106. See id. § 423.003(a)–(b) (stating it is a crime to use unmanned aircraft to conduct surveillance on 
individuals or private property). 
 107. Id. § 423.002(a)(1), (13), (17) (West 2013) (stating that it is lawful to use unmanned aircraft to 
capture images for scholarly research for institutions of higher education and their contractors, as well as 
real estate brokers and oil and gas businesses). 
 108. Edward Boula, Taking Flight or Landing: Implied Field Preemption Under the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1958 and Wyeth v. Levine, 24 DCBA Brief 34, 36 (2012) (“Field preemption arises when 
Congress occupies an entire field of a substantive area of law, which precludes any type or [sic] state 
interference within that field.”). 
 109. Skysign Int’l., Inc. v. City of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that there 
was no presumption against preemption because regulation of navigable airspace was “an area where 
there has been a history of significant federal presence” (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 
108 (2000))); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no presumption 
against preemption because the area of aviation safety “has long been dominated by federal interests.”). 
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navigable airspace through their UAS laws, they will not have the 
benefit of a strong presumption against preemption.110 
1.   Laws Attempting to Address Safety Concerns 
Many commentators have discussed safety issues surrounding 
UASs, including the threat of signal interruption and malfunctions.111 
Although UASs are used extensively overseas, some commentators 
fear that, if used in a populous area, hackers might hijack UASs or 
their signals might become corrupted, resulting in crashes. 112 
Although minor failures in rural or uninhabited areas are a concern, 
the same malfunctions arising over populous areas could be 
devastating.113  Regardless of how rational the concern, the courts 
have been clear the federal government has jurisdiction over aviation 
safety issues.114 
The FAA’s enabling act gave the Administrator the responsibility 
to “assign by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary to 
ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace.”115 The 
Ninth Circuit in Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines stated that the 
voluminous regulations in place and the mandate by 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40103(b) “sufficiently demonstrate an intent to occupy exclusively 
the entire field of aviation safety.”116 Courts have found preempted 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 471 (finding no presumption against preemption in the area of 
aviation safety); Skysign, 276 F.3d at 1116 (stating that there was no presumption against preemption 
because the state law was attempting to regulate navigable airspace). 
 111. See, e.g., Rapp, supra note 3, at 627, 630 (stating that when tested in a large city, 
communications between the controller and the aircraft could be interrupted and result in collisions with 
other aircraft or with the ground). 
 112. Oyegunle, supra note 97, at 367 (stating that UASs could be susceptible to hijackings by 
terrorists); Anya Kamenetz, Zombie Drones! Hacker Finds a Way to Hijack UAVs, FAST COMPANY 
(Dec. 4, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3022930/fast-feed/zombie-drones-hacker-finds-
a-way-to-hijack-uavs?partner=rss (discussing the ability to hijack and control UASs). 
 113. Simon Moya-Smith, ‘They’re Trying to Figure Out What Happened’: Malfunctioning Drone 
Hits Navy Ship, NBC News (Nov. 17, 2013) http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/17/21504769-
theyre-trying-to-figure-out-what-happened-malfunctioning-drone-hits-navy-
ship?lite&ocid=msnhp&pos=1 (discussing two incidents involving the crashing of department of 
defense drones). 
 114. Boula, supra note 108, at 34 (stating that the federal circuit courts are in agreement that “the 
entire field of ‘air safety’ is preempted”). 
 115. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2011). 
 116. Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a state law claim of 
failure to warn was preempted by federal law because “Congress has indicated its intent to occupy the 
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state laws involving safe use of navigable airspace, pilot training, and 
pilot regulation; however, they have left to the states matters 
involving product liability and failure to warn.117 
State laws that foreclose the possibility of any flight or flights with 
weapons on board are susceptible to a field preemption in the area of 
aviation safety if the statute’s purpose or legislative history indicate a 
concern for the safety of citizens and property.118 Because the FAA 
Administrator has the sole responsibility to regulate navigable 
airspace to ensure its safe use,119 if states attempt to restrict flights or 
limit their proximity to populated areas due to safety concerns, their 
laws would likely not survive a challenge.120 
2.   State Laws Addressing Privacy Concerns 
Many proposed and enacted statutes focus directly on surveillance 
and privacy and make no mention of safety concerns.121 If state laws 
regulate only privacy, which affects the rights of the public on the 
ground,122 there would likely not be a preemption concern because it 
                                                                                                                 
field of aviation safety”). But see O.S. v. Hageland Aviation Servs., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 889, 891–92 
(D. Ala. 2008) (remanding the aviation tort claim to state court after it was removed to the district court, 
reasoning that the court lacked federal question jurisdiction and stating that the Federal Aviation Act 
does not preempt all state court actions concerning aviation safety). The legislative history behind the 
Federal Aviation Act further indicates that Congress intended to give the FAA preemptive powers. H.R. 
REP. NO. 85-2360, at 3761 (1958) (Conf. Rep.) (“It is essential that one agency of government, and one 
agency alone, be responsible for issuing safety regulations if we are to have timely and effective 
guidelines for safety in aviation.”). 
 117. Holland, supra note 37, at 11. While matters involving the standard of care of pilots are subject 
to an implied preemption, victims may still pursue state remedies for violation of those federal safety 
standards. Id. at 17; see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O’Donell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(reasoning that while Congress has the “‘exclusive right to regulate safety in a given field,’” it has 
allowed the states to “‘maintain tort remedies covering much the same territory.’”). 
 118. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S333-02 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2012) (“This bill is going to make the air 
transportation system safer than ever before . . . .”). 
 119. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2011) (“The administrator of the [FAA] shall develop plans and 
policy . . . to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace.”). 
 120. See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2) (2011) (“The Administrator shall prescribe air traffic regulations on 
the flight of aircraft . . . .”). 
 121. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (2013) (prohibiting the use of a UAS for the purpose of 
conducting surveillance or gathering of evidence); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 837.310 (2013) 
(prohibiting any law enforcement agency from operating a drone); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003 
(West 2013) (making it illegal for any person to use “an unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an 
individual . . . with the intent to conduct surveillance”). 
 122. Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1117 (2002) (holding a state law was not 
preempted because it did not reach into the “forbidden, exclusively federal areas, such as flight paths, 
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would not be seen as regulating the flight of the UAS.123 Further, the 
FAA recently noted that it does not have the authority to regulate 
privacy; therefore, state privacy regulations would not be 
preempted. 124  There is some indication, however, that the courts 
could characterize an attempt to regulate UAS use due to privacy 
concerns as a regulation of navigable airspace, an area with a history 
of a strong federal presence, and therefore subject to preemption.125 
The Supreme Court has upheld the ability of law enforcement to 
use aircraft for surveillance on several occasions despite Fourth 
Amendment concerns. 126  This has included the ability of law 
enforcement to use fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to observe and 
to take detailed pictures of private property from navigable 
airspace.127 
Although some states are addressing the privacy concerns of their 
citizens through UAS laws, they do not address the use of manned 
aircraft for surveillance.128 These laws focus specifically on the use 
of UASs, although they serve similar purposes as manned aircraft. 
                                                                                                                 
hours, or altitudes.”). 
 123. See Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 68360, 68361 (Nov. 14, 2013). 
 124. Id. (“The FAA’s mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world 
and does not include regulating privacy.”). However, the FAA has introduced regulations that would 
regulate privacy within the test areas; these regulations would strengthen the inference that Congress 
intended to preempt the state law. See id. 
 125. See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no presumption 
against preemption because the area of aviation safety “has long been dominated by federal interests.”); 
Skysign, 276 F.3d at 1116 (finding that there was no presumption against preemption because there was 
a “history of significant federal presence” in the area of navigable airspace). 
 126. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448, 451 (1989) (denying a motion to suppress evidence 
when law enforcement used a helicopter to look with his naked-eye through openings in the roof of the 
suspect’s greenhouse); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 213, 215 (1986) (declining to rule it a 
violation of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights when law enforcement used a private plane flown at 
1,000 feet to investigate, with a naked eye, the presence of marijuana in the suspect’s yard); Dow Chem. 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230 (1986) (upholding EPA’s aerial photographing of a plant from a 
maximum of 12,000 feet with a mounted camera and reasoning that while it allows the viewer more 
detail than the naked eye, it does not permit viewing inside the walls of the plant). 
 127. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 448, 451 (allowing the use of a helicopter to look through the opening of a 
suspect’s roof); see also Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 230 (finding no Fourth Amendment violations 
when the EPA used cameras to take detailed photographs). 
 128. The laws passed thus far strictly limit their applications to UASs and make no mention of 
attempts to regulate manned aircraft. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213(2)(a) (2013) (prohibiting the 
use of a UAS for the purpose of conducting surveillance or gathering of evidence); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 837.310(1) (2013) (prohibiting any law enforcement agency from operating a UAS); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 423.003 (West 2013). 
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This is similar to the discrepancies noted in cases involving aerial 
advertising. For instance, in Banner Advertising v. City of Boulder, 
the Colorado supreme court held that a state law purporting to 
regulate aerial advertisements was preempted by federal 
regulations. 129  The court noted that the law did not address 
advertisers in general; it only impacted airplane operators towing 
advertisements.130 Therefore, rather than regulating advertising, they 
were actually regulating aircraft.131 
Likewise, state laws restricting surveillance by UASs also do not 
address surveillance conducted from manned aircraft. Aerial 
surveillance permitted by the Supreme Court will be subject to 
restriction by state laws based solely on whether a pilot is present in 
the cockpit. Because these laws only regulate the type of aircraft used 
while conducting surveillance rather than the surveillance itself, if a 
court applied reasoning similar to that in Skysign, it might find that 
such laws regulate the use of navigable airspace and are subject to 
federal preemption. 
III.   PROPOSAL 
The large increase in UAS technology in recent years has caused 
the UAS industry to grow rapidly.132 This growth has the potential to 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Banner Adver., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 868 P.2d 1077, 1082 (Colo. 1994) (stating that the state 
law banning advertising was preempted even though there was a presumption against preemption 
because the government “exercises pervasive control” over aerial advertising). But see Skysign, 276 F.3d 
at 1118 (upholding a law banning aerial advertising even though it found there was no presumption 
against preemption because the state was attempting to regulate navigable airspace). The court in 
Skysign distinguished its case from Banner Advertising because the Certificate of Waiver received by 
the operators in Skysign contained a provision that required compliance with state and local laws. Id. at 
1118 n.6. 
 130. Banner, 868 P.2d at 1082; see also Skysign, 276 F.3d at 1116 (stating that no presumption 
applied because the ordinance “rather than addressing advertising generally specifically targets for 
regulation ‘an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence,’ i.e., navigable 
airspace.” (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000))). 
 131. Banner, 868 P.2d at 1082 (noting that the regulation was one of aircraft operators); Skysign, 276 
F.3d at 1116 (stating that the regulation was targeted at navigable airspace). 
 132. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2011–2031, at 49 
(2011), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/
aerospace_forecasts/2011-2031/media/2011%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf (noting that while the industry is 
still in its “infancy,” the agency expects a large increase in the coming decades). 
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bring added commerce and jobs to states that welcome the new 
industry. 133  Legislators should not be quick to alienate such a 
growing industry by passing reactionary legislation that will prevent 
new businesses and jobs from being created in their state.134 
State and local legislatures must address their citizens’ concerns 
through the careful passage of UAS laws. While states may pass laws 
furthering the ideals of their citizens, they cannot proceed in areas 
preempted by federal law.135 State laws limiting the use of UASs 
must be drafted cautiously so as to avoid regulating preempted 
subfields within aviation136 because the courts will look not only at 
the text of the statutes involved but also the concerns addressed by 
the state statute.137 
A.   Outright Ban on Flights 
Legislators must be clear about the intended purpose of statutes 
attempting to completely ban the flight of UASs over a particular 
area. If bans do not directly address privacy concerns, the court will 
likely characterize the law as a regulation of safety or airspace.138 
Courts have been clear that the sub-field of aviation safety has been 
completely taken up by federal statutes and regulations;139 therefore, 
drafters must avoid this inference and clearly state their purpose to 
protect citizen privacy. 
Legislatures should include an express purpose for their UAS laws 
to avoid any inference that their laws regulate aviation safety. Bills 
addressing concerns historically controlled by the states (e.g., 
nuisance, privacy, and property) will be presumptively valid and thus 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Dave Kolpack, Aviation Schools Prepare for Boom in Drone Jobs, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 19, 
2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/aviation-schools-prepare-boom-drone-jobs (stating that a well-
known university now offers unmanned aircraft degree programs and they are expecting more than 
70,000 jobs will develop in the first three years after drones are permitted in the airspace). 
 134. Villasenor, supra note 24, at 466 (stating that the industry is growing rapidly and one group 
predicts that global UAS spending will rise to as much as $11 billion in the next decade). 
 135. See discussion supra note 37 and Part I. 
 136. See discussion supra Part II. 
 137. See discussion supra Part II. 
 138. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 139. Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Congress has indicated its intent 
to occupy the field of aviation safety.”). 
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will not be preempted.140 However, the court will still look at the 
overall effect and purpose of state statutes to determine if it is, in 
fact, a veiled attempt to address their constituents’ safety concerns. 
States must also avoid frustrating the purpose of the federal law by 
undermining the Act’s overall research and integration purposes.141 
For example, Texas included an exception limiting the negative 
effects its law has on the fulfillment of the Act’s purpose. 142  It 
permits the use of UASs in federally designated “test ranges,” 
allowing the research and testing of UASs that the FAA needs to 
accomplish the Act’s goal of integration in specified areas. 143  In 
2014, Texas became one of six states to host a federal UAS test site 
and established its own research site at Texas A&M University.144 
Texas’s approach permits states to limit UAS use over unauthorized 
areas such as cities and populous districts while helping to develop 
the technology for future use. 
B.   Banning Surveillance 
Laws that ban only surveillance using UASs have the best chance 
of survival. These laws not only address a real concern of 
constituents, but they also benefit from a presumption of non-
preemption.145 However, states must be cautious not to frustrate the 
purpose of the Act or draft the bill in such a way as to appear to 
regulate the use of airspace.146 
To further limit the law, legislators could also prohibit the use of 
images for law enforcement investigations.147 Permitting civil entities 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See discussion supra Part II.C; see also Villasenor, supra note 24. 
 141. See supra note 43. 
 142. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002(a)(2) (West 2013) (stating that the law is not applicable for 
uses within the “airspace designated as a test site or range authorized by the Federal Aviation 
Administration for the purpose of integrating unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Press Release, FAA Announces Texas UAS Test Site Now Operational (June 20, 2014), 
available at http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsid=16454. 
 145. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 146. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 147. See OR. REV. STAT. § 837.310 (2013) (limiting its prohibition to uses by law enforcement 
agencies); S.B. 1587, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (“[A] law enforcement agency may not 
use a drone to gather information.”); 2013 Va. Acts 755 (mentioning only the law enforcement use of 
UASs). 
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and private citizens to use UAS technology allows investment in this 
new and growing field of aviation while limiting the negative effects 
on privacy rights. Although there would still be normal limits on the 
intrusion into privacy, the public could continue to use the 
technology in various ways such as filming movies, cartography, and 
recreation, while protecting citizens from the admission of images 
obtained by UASs as evidence in judicial proceedings. 
Restricting civilian use of UASs for information gathering and 
photography could raise concerns over First Amendment 
protections.148 If civil use is allowed, the use of the images of persons 
captured by the UAS could require the permission of the subject in 
the photo.149 Such an approach would protect the public while still 
allowing UAS use. 
Yet another concern is that courts may find that the ban on 
surveillance applies to the use of UASs themselves because they do 
not address the same actions when performed by manned aircraft.150 
This could be overcome by either differentiating the potential issues 
involved in UAS surveillance rather than manned aircraft 
surveillance or by simply including manned flights in the bill. Some 
of the concerns with UAS surveillance arise from their ability to 
remain in flight for long periods and their use of high-powered 
surveillance equipment.151  States could reiterate the added risk to 
privacy and the possible Fourth Amendment violations that UASs 
pose to demonstrate the need for regulating their use while permitting 
the continued use of manned surveillance.152 
Since the drafters of UAS bills are concerned with the overreach of 
law enforcement agencies, inclusion of manned flights in a ban is an 
effective solution. A limit on the aerial surveillance of a person or 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Kaminski, supra note 6, at 61 (stating that courts have not resolved whether “privacy or speech 
triumphs in this conflict”). 
 149. See OR. REV. STAT. § 837.330 (West 2013) (permitting law enforcement to use UASs to 
“acquir[e] information about an individual . . . if the individual has given written consent to the use of a 
drone for those purposes.”). 
 150. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 151. Kellington, supra note 3, at 658–59 (noting the quality and the quantity for information that can 
be collected by UAS use); Oyegunle, supra note 98, at 378 (stating that “[d]rones are “vastly superior to 
traditional aerial technology” and they can view from greater heights for “days at a time”). 
 152.  See Oyegunle, supra note 97. 
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property by law enforcement would avoid privacy problems. By 
limiting the amount of time spent doing surveillance and even the 
technology permitted for use, legislators could address many of these 
concerns without making the use of a UAS the focus of the law. 
Historically, courts have allowed the use of surveillance by law 
enforcement from greater distances and with increasing 
technologies.153 A limit on the distance of the surveillance and the 
equipment available for use not only alleviates concerns over UAS 
surveillance but also places limits on all aerial intrusions into the 
privacy of private citizens by law enforcement. 
Another approach that would limit or prevent law enforcement use 
would be a law banning the use of state funds for UASs.154 This 
approach avoids the appearance of regulating drone flight while still 
limiting drone use for law enforcement surveillance and allowing 
research and development by private individuals and entities.155 
C.   Rate, Route, and Service 
Regardless of the type of law passed, states must avoid interfering 
with the function of air carriers. Due to the express preemption clause 
found in the Airline Deregulation Act, a state UAS law regulating 
rate, route, or service of an air carrier will be expressly preempted.156 
Although the transportation of persons via UAS is wrought with 
difficulties, a UAS will likely conform to the definition of air carrier 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448, 451 (1989) (denying a motion to suppress evidence 
when a law enforcement officer used a helicopter to look with his naked eye through openings in the 
roof of the suspect’s greenhouse); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (declining to rule it a 
violation of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights when law enforcement used a private plane flown at 
1,000 feet to investigate, with a naked eye, the presence of marijuana in the suspect’s yard); Dow Chem. 
Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (upholding the aerial photographing of a plant by the EPA from a 
maximum of 12,000 feet with a mounted camera and reasoning that although it allows the viewer more 
detail than the naked eye, it does not permit viewing inside the walls of the plant). 
 154. Villasenor, supra note 24, at 514. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (“[S]tates may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other 
provision . . . related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation”); 
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232 (1995) (stating that the ADA’s preemption clause and 
the Federal Aviation Act’s savings clause “stop[] States from imposing their own substantive standards 
with respect to rates, routes, or services”). 
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if it delivers mail or packages. 157  Innovative companies plan to 
develop these vehicles for the delivery of packages to homes with 
shorter delivery times.158 A state prohibition preventing the delivery 
of mail regulates the service of the air carrier and therefore is subject 
to an express preemption.159  However, this is easily remedied by 
including a provision that permits UASs to deliver mail or packages, 
allowing private corporations to continue UAS development while 
leaving the remainder of the statute intact. If the purpose of the ban is 
simply to limit intrusion into the privacy of citizens, this exception 
does not harm the purpose of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress’s stated purpose in passing the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012 is to update the nation’s airspace and to develop 
a plan to incorporate the use of new technologies to make air travel 
safer and more efficient.160 Congress included in its modernization 
efforts the integration of unmanned aerial systems into the domestic 
airspace.161 When it did so, state legislators worried that allowing the 
use of technologically advanced vehicles might endanger the rights 
of citizens, leading some to introduce and pass laws prohibiting the 
flight, weaponization, and surveillance use of UASs.162 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Although there are currently no plans for the transportation of individuals, there are companies 
that are looking into uses in mail and package delivery. While these vehicles may be used for 
transporting passengers in the future, there are not currently any plans to do so. Kellington, supra note 3, 
at 634 (noting that several companies are currently researching the use of large UASs for the 
transportation of goods). 
 158. Timothy B. Lee, Amazon Envisions Eventually Delivering Packages in 30 Minutes Via Drones, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2013, 9:15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/
12/01/amazon-wants-to-deliver-packages-in-30-minutes-with-drones/?tid=pm_business_pop (discussing 
Amazon’s chief executive’s plans of using small UASs to deliver small packages to consumers in order 
to shorten the delivery times). 
 159. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 160. See discussion supra note 25. 
 161. FAA Modernization and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 112–95, 126 Stat. 11, § 332(a)(1) (requiring 
the FAA to “accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace 
system.”). 
 162. See discussion supra Part I. 
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The express preemption of prices, routes, and services of air 
carriers163 and navigable airspace164 will prevent the application of 
laws banning UAS flights over populous areas or those attempting to 
control the altitudes of flights, despite the validity of the concerns 
addressed. 165  Further, courts have held that there is a strong 
preemption in the area of aviation safety.166 If a state law is silent or 
unclear as to its purpose, it could be characterized as addressing 
safety concerns and thus be preempted.167 
State UAS laws also run the risk of conflicting with either the 
express provisions or the fulfillment of the Act’s purpose.168 States 
must avoid frustrating the law by permitting flights in the federally 
designated “test ranges,” allowing officials to develop the technology 
needed for integration.169 
Carefully drafted laws banning the use of UASs for surveillance 
will not be subject to a federal preemption.170 The concern with laws 
banning UAS surveillance is the possible characterization that they 
are regulating navigable airspace rather than surveillance because 
they do not address manned flights conducting the same surveillance 
with the same equipment.171 Since manned flights using the same 
technology pose the same threats to privacy that prompted lawmakers 
to introduce UAS laws, addressing the threat from both sources 
would be an appropriate solution.172 
While these lawmakers are addressing valid concerns of their 
citizens, they need to carefully draft their measures. Detailed laws 
that take a nuanced approach, rather than allowing the hunting of 
UASs or banning their use altogether, have a much better chance at 
survival. Drafters focusing on privacy concerns and avoiding areas of 
                                                                                                                 
 163. 49 U.S.C. § 41713. 
 164. See discussion supra note 104. 
 165. Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1117 (2002) (describing the forbidden 
areas of regulation for states as flight paths, hours, or altitudes). 
 166. Boula, supra note 108. 
 167. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 168. See discussion supra note 93. 
 169. See discussion supra note 135. 
 170. See discussion supra Part III. 
 171. See discussion supra note 120. 
 172. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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safety, navigable airspace, and the service of air carriers will find 
their laws not only benefit from a presumption of non-preemption, 
but also will likely not be preempted. 
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